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Function, Form, and Strawberries: 
Subverting Langdell
Jeremiah A. Ho
I. Introduction
While many of us are feverishly trying to peg what is the “new normal” in 
legal education these days, there should be an equally compelling urgency 
to explore the new normative as well. With “should” as the operative, this 
notion is itself reflexively normative; but truthfully it is critical that the spirit 
of pondering over the state of affairs in law schools should unapologetically 
include experimenting and refining toward enhanced teaching and learning in 
the legal academy. We should never relegate normativity to an afterthought or 
a punch line, but rather should always be striving to figure out what law school 
pedagogy should be, how it best serves our students, and what is next for its 
development in light of the next new normal of law schools and the next-next 
new normal after that.
With that idealism in tow, this article turns to addressing an aspect of the 
law classroom experience that has always come under fire even during the early 
years of the Langdell case method: the lack of active learning experiences that 
teach legal reasoning skills in doctrinal courses.1 Then the article humbly offers 
a solution. The prevalence of formalism during those early years of American 
law schools contributed to classroom teaching techniques that limited the 
1. See Alfred Z. reed, TrAining for The Public Profession of The lAw: hisToricAl 
develoPmenT And PrinciPAl conTemPorAry Problems of legAl educATion in The 
uniTed sTATes, wiTh some AccounT of condiTions in englAnd And cAnAdA, bulleTin 
no. 15, 48 (1921) (critiquing how practical training and “even its remnants are not usually 
regarded by the law schools as worth preserving, now that [law schools] have virtually 
preempted the entire field of legal education.”); see also roy sTuckey eT Al., besT PrAcTices 
for legAl educATion, A vision And A roAd mAP 104 (2007) (“Legal education would be 
more effective if law teachers used context-based education throughout the curriculum.”).
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learning of skills on several different levels.2 What is plainly curious—and 
ultimately egregious—has been the prevalence of these formalist experiences in 
our teaching even when movements from legal realism to critical legal studies 
have rejected formalist thinking.3 If we no longer subscribe to the formalist 
tradition and our thinking about the law has progressed since the late 19th 
century, why do we continue to teach law as if not much has changed? 
Sparked by Professor Michele Pistone’s efforts toward bringing new ideas 
to the forefront at her recent LegalED conference, Igniting Law Teaching,4 I 
approached answering that question by posing my solution to teaching law 
differently. The conference, held at American University, Washington College 
of Law this past April 2014, brought a confluence of teaching and learning 
ideas together through a new (or at least new to the many of us) presentation 
format—the TED talk—and, partly because of it, was literally a confrontation 
with change as we shared our insights.5 Ultimately, the conference invited 
innovation in the current crisis in legal education, and this article is just one of 
a number of fruits of that labor.
Beyond this Part I Introduction, Part II will briefly summarize why the 
Langdell tradition is at heart a learning model that intrinsically marginalizes 
active learning and exalts only a limited experience of skills teaching and 
acquisition and will conclude that the Langdellian tradition creates a 
hierarchy that juxtaposes knowledge of legal doctrine over skills.  Part III will 
demonstrate a method for law teachers to incorporate skills teaching actively 
in the classroom, and do so in a way that legitimizes legal reasoning skills 
and elevates the teaching and learning of skills. Hopefully, as the Conclusion 
points out, the new normative in law schools should include a continuous 
engagement with active learning that integrates skills into the doctrinal 
classroom in a seamless way, rather than a formalist concept of education that 
isolates and depoliticizes law from practice. Whatever the new normal of law 
schools looks like now,  one thing about the law will not change: The law is a 
discipline that is brought to life by us and our students through its practice.6 
We cannot ignore that aspect of this field—nor afford to.  
2. See Steven B. Dow, There’s Madness in the Method: A Commentary on Law, Statistics, and the Nature of 
Legal Education, 57 oklA. l. rev. 579, 580-82 (2004) (discussing legal formalism’s influence 
on the emergence of the case method).
3. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and ____ Really Seriously: Before, During and After “The 
Law,” 60 vAnd. l. rev. 555, 560-76, 580 (2007) (describing the history and influence of 
American legal movements from Langdell to post-modernists but noting ultimately that” 
. . . “a major rethinking of legal education has not occurred, really, in over one hundred 
years.”).  
4. See, e.g., ‘Igniting Law Teaching’ a TEDx-style conference, legAled (Apr. 4, 2014), http://legaledweb.
com/schedule-igniting-law-teaching-april-4th/ .
5. See, e.g., Michele Pistone, Educational Videos for Legal Education, legAled blog (Nov. 11, 2014), 
http://legaledweb.com/blog/.
6. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 557 (“Law is created by human beings to govern 
themselves, to create order and social control, and, at its best, to provide justice. So, in my 
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II. Form Over Function: The Langdellian Hierarchy
For a while the jig has been up; there is no mystery that the case method 
is an educational model prone to furthering hierarchies. Duncan Kennedy 
most famously articulated that reality in his Legal Education and the 
Reproduction of Hierarchy7 in 1982, and others have followed since then.8 
Pointing out a direct cause-and-effect in law school teaching and hierarchies, 
Kennedy observed in crit-laden fashion that “[m]uch of what happens is the 
inculcation through a formal curriculum and the classroom experience of a set 
of political attitudes toward the economy and society in general, toward law, 
and toward the possibilities of life in the profession.”9 A recent cadre of law 
scholars has continued to pronounce the hierarchical potency of Langdell’s 
law school model and examined how such hierarchy “endures”10—even after a 
century and a half since Langdell and the formalists, and since the flaws and 
inaccuracies in the way the formalists both thought about the law and have 
taught it have been identified.11 As Olufunmilayo Arewa, Andrew Morriss, 
and William Henderson recently articulated, “the development of the current 
model of legal education [from Langdell] included features that facilitated the 
establishment of an enduring hierarchy.”12
Not only is this infiltration of hierarchy historical,13 but it is also systemic as 
the categorization between elite and non-elite schools affect significant choices 
view, to study how law is made, interpreted, complied with, enforced, or resisted, is to study 
how law is experienced−by those who make and interpret law, by those who use it and advise 
others how to use it, and by those who are acted upon by law.”).
7. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. legAl educ. 591 
(1982).
8. See, e.g., PhiliP c. kissAm, The disciPline of lAw schools: The mAking of modern 
lAwyers 109 (2003) (describing hierarchy in teaching judicial opinions) (“Law professors 
make many hierarchical observations and normalizing judgments about judicial opinions.”); 
Jay Feinman & Mark Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 geo. l.J. 875, 896-97 (1984) 
(describing law school hierarchy in “Darwinian terms”) (“The complex hierarchies of law 
schools, law students, law professors, and lawyers’ practice settings are justified as reflecting 
real differences in the abilities of those stratified. The educational system, from the earliest 
grades to the law schools, is a process of continually finer sorting of students by natural 
ability; the function of the system is the selection of talent, rather than the development of 
talent across the board.”). 
9. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 595. 
10. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa et al., Enduring Hierarchies in American Legal Education, 89 ind. l J. 
941 (2014).
11. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists, the Real Realists, and What They Tell Us About Judicial 
Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 mich. l. rev. 863, 879 (2011) (“One problem with the 
Langdellian approach, as noted above and as Tamanaha’s analysis of Formalist legal thought 
indicates, is that it is less modern than it appears; the classroom dialogue is not intended to 
teach a skill, but rather an understanding of the judicial process and the common law.”).
12. Arewa et al., supra note 10, at 949.
13. See id. at 945-50.
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law schools make  including those regarding scholarship,14 administrative and 
faculty hiring,15 and branding and marketing.16 From another angle, Brian 
Tamanaha’s recent critique of law schools shows the undercurrent of hierarchy 
that the Langdellian model of American law schools perpetuated.17 And yet, 
his proposal to divide law schools into two separate camps—one academic 
and another vocational—quite possibly shows the susceptibility of dividing 
the identity of law schools between a hierarchy based on form (academic law 
schools) over function (vocational law schools).18
But the lawyer’s penchant for ambiguity and the strategic avoidance of 
absolutist statements prevent one from saying that Langdell was entirely wrong 
about legal education. After all, Langdell’s efforts were in part addressing the 
problems of legal education before and up until his time.19 Even superficially 
speaking, Langdell’s case method was an improvement upon the hit-or-miss 
training and learning experiences afforded by the apprenticeship model, which 
eventually led to the conclusion that “reliance on busy practitioners to provide 
an adequate legal education is an inherently and deeply flawed strategy.”20 
Instead, the pedagogical fix that Langdell’s model provided was consistency 
methodologically: “The Langdellian model law school addressed the problem 
of unmotivated teachers, slowly, by utilizing full-time professors.”21
More profoundly, other than establishing a more consistent, more readily 
available professoriate to train lawyers, the Langdellian method was also 
more steady conceptually and metaphysically. Langdell’s view of law as a 
science became the pedagogy that distinguished the analytical training in 
14. See id. at 976-90.
15. See id. at 990-91.
16. See id. at 992-1002.
17. See, e.g., briAn Z. TAmAnAhA, fAiling lAw schools 21-23 (2012). Tamanaha describes the 
rise of the three-year law school model at Harvard Law School in 1878—presumably at the 
hands of Langdell—as a process to standardize university-affiliated legal education in order 
to attract students away from cheaper night law school programs taught by practitioners: 
“Elite legal professionals who controlled the ABA worried that these new lawyers [from 
cheaper night law schools] would further tarnish the already sullied reputation of the bar.” 
Id. at 21.
18. See, e.g., robin l. wesT, TeAching lAw: JusTice, PoliTics, And The demAnds of 
ProfessionAlism 20-21 (2014). West critiques Tamanaha’s proposal for reforming legal 
education by deregulating schools into a “bifurcated model” with academic law schools 
on one level and vocational law schools on another by noting its hierarchical potentials: 
“[B]ifurcation would lead to a two-tiered and bifurcated legal profession . . . .” Id. at 21.
19. See Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, No Path But One: Law School Survival in the Age of 
Disruptive Technology, 59 wAyne l. rev. 193, 207-22 (2014) (describing, despite its conceptual 
flaws, the rise of Langdell’s case method for law instruction as a response to remedy the 
failings of the apprenticeship system of training lawyers).
20. Id. at 217.
21. Id. at 218.
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the academy from legal training done within the apprenticeship model.22 At 
the close of the 19th century, it was clear that “[b]y general agreement, the 
eventual replacement of the law office route by law schools greatly improved 
the teaching of the analytical skills necessary to a successful career in the 
law.”23 Thus, the institutionalizing of the legal academy in the 19th century has 
brought some benefits to educating and training lawyers. Whether it brought 
an academic legitimacy with all its bells and whistles that greatly improved 
the apprenticeship model is debatable.24 The study of law, nevertheless, has 
been given a methodology.25 That legacy, and knowing that Langdell was 
intentionally part of the advance for change in legal education, prompts us to, 
at least, take some reconciliatory spirit toward improving our teaching as well.
Still, even as we give Langdell his due, the opportunity to reshape the 
model of legal education is now overdue. Both the nature and concept of 
modern law have evolved immensely since Langdell’s heyday.26 The body 
of common law and its accompanying traditions that the modern American 
legal landscape once inherited now shares the terrain with administrative 
and regulatory states and the idea of the law’s jurisprudential completeness 
was long abolished when Legal Realism took over.27 But a strong imprint of 
Langdell’s model, preserved in formalist conceptions, still remains.28 We see 
its survival in the way our textbooks are still called “casebooks,”29 in the way 
we still conduct our lectures Socratically,30 in the way we build the content 
22. Id. at 221-22.
23. Id. at 222. 
24. See Arewa et al., supra note 10, at 946-47 (describing Langdell’s model at Harvard Law School 
as the model that emerged successfully after lingering displeasure by legal elites such as 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., of previous law school models that resembled trade schools 
rather than academic institutions). 
25. See Keith A. Findley, Rediscovering the Lawyer School: Curriculum Reform in Wisconsin, 24 wis. inT’l 
l.J. 295, 299-300 (2006) (“As a corollary to Langdell’s notion of law as science—that that 
law is best understood by inductive reasoning from primary sources (appellate decisions)—
Langdell introduced the ‘case method’ of legal instruction.”) (citing Stephen M. Feldman, 
The Transformation of an Academic Discipline: Law Professors in the Past and Future (or Toy Story Too), 54 J. 
legAl educ. 471, 476 (2004)).
26. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 560-76. 
27. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 880 (noting that “common law is no longer the dominant law 
of the United States” and that “the major part [of the law today] consists of statutes and 
regulations, the legal machinery of modern regulatory government.”).
28. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 580. 
29. See id. at 563 (“Thousands of law students for many decades were taught essentially with the 
same methods and from the same casebooks, regardless of region or differing career goals.”).
30. See Matthew T. Bodie, Collaboration and Community: The Labor Law Group and the Future of Labor 
and Employment Casebooks, 58 sT. louis u. l.J. 61, 62 (2013) (“The Socratic method is still 
the usual method of instruction.”) (citing Edward Rubin, Should Law School Support Faculty 
Research?, 17 J. conTemP. legAl issues 139, 158 (2008)). 
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of our courses—especially those in the first year—with canonical cases,31 in the 
way we reward a student’s ability to analyze cases and reason through analogy 
and precedence,32 and in the way we changed the first-year curriculum, usually 
by adding to the original arrangement of private law courses (torts, contracts, 
property, etc.) rather than rearranging it for a more transformative set.33
Others have attacked the Langdellian law school curriculum, seeing its 
supposition of the law’s autonomy as too hermetic to the point that it excludes 
other kinds of legal knowledge that would be relevant for law students.34   Of 
recent note in the current discourse on the future of legal education, Robin 
West has articulated that the study of both politics and justice are often 
overshadowed by the traditional case method and that deficiencies of these 
kinds of knowledge, despite their actual close relation to the law, in the 
law classroom present to the current turmoil in law schools.35 The common 
law tradition is not as complete as it was once thought. The realists poked 
holes at the self-proclaimed supremacy of formalism in this way.36 But over a 
century, the American legal tradition has also evolved to encompass the vast 
codification of rules of law and stoke a growing need to study legisprudence and 
the administrative state in addition to common law traditions.37 And so if the 
primary reason to conduct classes Socratically was a belief in the completeness 
of our inherited body of common law traditions so that a scientific inquiry 
could be used to study it, and if such an idea about the law is no longer as true 
31. See Robert W. Gordon, Simpson’s Leading Cases, 95 mich. l. rev. 2044, 2044 (1996) (“Although 
the ideal of legal science that the ‘case method’ was supposed to inculcate has faded over 
the years, the method has spread to every law school in America, and with it the (remarkably 
durable) repertoire of famous cases that almost every student still encounters in the first year 
of law study.”).
32. See R. Michael Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal Education Now, 53 b.c. 
l. rev. 1515, 1520-21 (2012) (describing how “[t]he case method presumes that lawyers, as 
social ‘scientists,’ can study appellate decisions to uncover legal principles, classify and 
organize these principles, and then develop a structure that will allow them to apply the 
doctrines to a more general set of facts in order to reach a solution to legal questions” 
and then noting that “[t]his process of conceptualization and categorization—so heavily 
emphasized in law schools for the past 150 years—employs an inductive form of reasoning 
and teaches students to reason from specific examples (i.e., appellate decisions) to universal 
propositions.” (citations omitted)).
33. See, e.g., wesT, supra note 18, at 188-93 (describing changes that would bring teaching of 
justice and politics into the traditional law school curriculum for more normative results).
34. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 wAsh. & lee l. 
rev. 1949, 2023-24 (2012) (mentioning broadly that “[o]ne consequence of [Langdell’s] 
doctrinal approach is that the study of law is conceptualized as the study of legal rules—a 
Langdellian innovation—rather than a broader study of legal practice involving the study 
of legal regulation as a social phenomenon and training in the full array of methods and 
techniques that legal practitioners must be able to employ.” (citations omitted)). 
35. See generally wesT, supra note 18, at 27-28. 
36. See Meadow-Menkel, supra note 3, at 567.
37. See wesT, supra note 18, at 126-28.
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as it once was, then the ways in which courses are still taught in that tradition 
have also been called into question.38
Both of these observations often fuel practice-ready criticisms from outside 
the walls of the academy, and especially from within the profession, because 
Langdell’s formalist concept of the law do not entirely reflect the nature of law 
practice today.39 For example, the recent report from the newly formed ABA 
Task Force on the Future of Legal Education that weighed in on the current 
turmoil in legal education typifies this practice-oriented criticism by noting 
that “the core purpose common to all law schools is to prepare individuals to 
provide legal and related services in a professionally responsible fashion”40 and 
that “[t]his elementary fact is often minimized.”41 Consequently, the task force’s 
report prompted a call for more that law schools should do “toward developing 
the competencies and professionalism required of people who will deliver 
services to clients.”42 Other examples from the practicing bar have emerged 
in droves in recent years.43 Without systemic change, that observation, in the 
meantime, collides with the traditional case method.44 Langdell’s original 
obsession with defining a “learned profession” resulted in a model of teaching 
and learning that reflects the “learned” within the phrase, but often misses 
38. See eliZAbeTh merTZ, The lAnguAge of lAw school: leArning To “Think like A lAwyer” 
26 (2007) (stating that Langdell “linked this method for teaching with an overall substantive 
theory of law, predicated on the idea that there are foundational legal principles, analogous 
to scientific law, that are discernable through analysis of the raw data of appellate cases.”). 
Mertz also describes the criticism of the case method: “There have been numerous critiques 
of Langdell’s formalist philosophy and pedagogical system—most notably from the legal 
realist school of the 1930s, which also pressed for more clinical education in law schools, and 
more recently from critical scholars within the legal academy. However, despite a number 
of arguably successful attacks on the substantive underpinnings of Langdell’s approach, the 
method itself appears to have outlasted its theoretical rationale.” Id. (citations omitted)). 
39. See reed, supra note 1. The most recently famous of these criticisms from beyond the citadel 
of the legal academy has been the series of articles that The New York Times has written. See, 
e.g., David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, n.y. Times, Nov. 19, 2011 
(associating Langdell’s case method with lack of practical knowledge taught in law schools: 
“Mr. Langdell introduced ‘case method,’ which is the short answer to the question ‘What 
does law school teach you if not how to be a lawyer?’ This approach cultivates a student’s 
capacity to reason and all but ignores the particulars of practice.”). 
40. finAl rePorT, 2014 A.b.A. TAsk force on legAl educATion 1, 3, http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_
and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter TAsk force 
rePorT].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Eunice Park, Legal Education: Integrating Practical Skills into the Curriculum, orAnge 
counTy lAw, June 2014, at 16 (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers/
cfm?abstract_id=2446354..
44. See, e.g., Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. legAl educ. 353, 366 (2011) (arguing 
that the case method “diminish[es] students’ ability to think about the knotty relationship 
among facts and culture and clients and law.”).
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the “profession” that the adjective “learned.”45 It also juxtaposes a dichotomy 
between learned and non-learned.46 In essence, Langdell’s method achieved 
and delivered us a vision of lawyering, but one that is not receptive to the 
realities of the profession.47 So in a very pervasive sense, there is a mismatch.48
What would reconcile this mismatch is for the curriculum and pedagogy of 
law schools to incorporate the transfer of learning legal knowledge—in essence, 
what is acquired in the course of study—into instrumentality within a life in 
the law—essentially, practice that would produce the engaged professional.49 
“Transfer of learning” is a concept in education theory representing the 
process by which we “transfer our previous learning and experience in order to 
more quickly and efficiently learn a new skill.”50 But, unfortunately, awareness 
of transfer is exactly what the potential for hierarchies in Langdell’s method 
hinders.51 In fact, any effort to build transfer of learning into the law school 
experience is overshadowed by hierarchy because essentially the method and 
its continuing remnants marginalize the skills teaching that would otherwise 
be instrumental.52 
45. See TAsk force rePorT, supra note 40.
46. See Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. legAl Prof. 89, 124 (2004) (discussing 
implications of viewing law as learned profession upon accessing justice in poverty contexts).
47. See Spencer, supra note 34, at 1975 (“Langdell believed that law was a form of natural science 
in that it consisted of a coherent system of rules derived from general principles that could 
only be discerned through the study of observable phenomena—the judicial opinions in 
which the principles were manifested.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 2018 (“Indeed, the 
numerous shortcomings of the American model of legal education have been documented 
extensively: Law school does not routinely provide training in many of the practice skill 
areas—such as drafting, counseling, planning, client development, and client management—
needed to be a successful practitioner . . . .” (citations omitted)).
48. Unreceptive might be one way to put it. Obtuse might be another. Even a quick and 
facetious glance at the phrase “think like a lawyer”—utterly Langdellian and emblematic—
shows the phrase for what it is: a simile that is slightly removed from what educating lawyers 
should mean. Others have criticized it in its context as the historical motto for law teaching 
and/or have replaced it with “what it means to be a lawyer” or at least “what lawyers do” 
in order to recalibrate or further define the goal of educating and training lawyers. See, e.g., 
Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Lost Question:  What is the Purpose of Law School?, 53 J. legAl 
educ. 48, 58 (2003) (“A better way to understand what lawyers do is to look at the functions 
lawyers actually perform. If we can define a set of lawyering functions, we can examine 
them to see what types of skills and knowledge they require. Those clusters of skills and 
knowledge constitute the functional elements of thinking like a lawyer.”). 
49. See sTuckey eT Al., supra note 1, at 28 (”The school is committed to preparing its students to 
practice law effectively and responsibly in the contexts they are likely to encounter as new 
lawyers.”).
50. roberT e. hAskell, TrAnsfer of leArning: cogniTion, insTrucTion, And reAsoning 24 
(2001).  
51. See Tonya Kowalski, True North: Navigating For the Transfer of Learning in Legal Education, 34 seATTle 
u. l. rev. 51, 76-79 (2010) (characterizing Langdell’s model for law schools as “a temple of 
knowledge” that as a consequence imparted little on developing practical skills).
52. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 596 (“[T]he teaching of skills in the mystified context of legal 
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The current incarnation of the case method marginalizes skills most vividly 
through the way doctrinal courses stack knowledge over skills instruction.53 
For instance, instead of a possibly more egalitarian approach among courses, 
the first-year curriculum will likely have four or five doctrinal courses—with 
each course ranging in credits worth three to six units—juxtaposed against one 
introductory course on legal research and writing that is most often capped 
at two units worth of credits.54 Law school curricula are not immune from 
the phenomenon of the hidden curriculum, where indirect messages about 
its education model can be extracted from the way the curriculum presents 
the law school’s offerings, whether these messages are deliberate or not.55 The 
messages seem clear. After the first year, and when students are left to plan 
their second- and third-year courses, they enter that part of their law school 
career already with an ingrained preference for doctrinal courses over skills or 
experience courses.56
Where the traditional law school model does not openly marginalize 
skills—in moments when it does spotlight them—often it is only a limited set 
of skills explored in a disconnected way.57 The typical set of skills explored by 
reasoning about utterly connected legal problems means that skills are taught badly, 
unselfconsciously, to be absorbed by osmosis as picks up the knack of ‘thinking like a 
lawyer.’”).   
53. See Duncan Kennedy, Introduction, 73 umkc l. rev. 231, 232 (2004) (discussing incidentally 
the relative perceptions of academic support faculty in ranking among other skills faculties—
legal writing in particular—in a more general discussion about the historical hierarchy 
between casebook/doctrinal faculty versus legal writing).  
54. See David S. Romantz, The Truth About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the Law School 
Curriculum, 52 u. kAn. l. rev. 105, 135-36 (2003) (noting that a 2002 ALWD survey reported 
that “first-year required legal writing courses averaged two credits in the fall term and two 
credits in the spring term–significantly less than the average first-year doctrinal course—and 
some law schools reported only one credit for each semester.”). 
55. See David M. Moss, The Hidden Curriculum of Legal Education: Toward a Holistic Model for Reform, 
2013 J. disP. resol. 19, 20 (2013) (“The problem with the Langdellian model is not that 
its subjects or methods are inappropriate, but rather that they convey seriously distorted 
messages about law and lawyers and therefore fail to convey additional needed information 
and skills. These messages are mostly implicit in the structure of law school courses, 
erroneously suggesting that the bulk of what lawyers do is to analyze and argue appellate 
law and that other functions are less common or important. The implicit nature of these 
messages, which are repeatedly reinforced in multiple courses, conveys a powerful subliminal 
lesson.” (citations omitted)).
56. See Melissa Marlow-Shafer, Student Evaluation of Teacher Performance and the “Legal Writing 
Pathology:” Diagnosis Confirmed, 5 n.y. ciTy l. rev. 115, 132 (2002) (drawing a correlation 
between lower prestige of legal writing courses in law schools and the number of credits 
assigned to legal writing courses).
57. See Deborah Zalesne & David Nadvorney, Why Don’t They Get It?: Academic Intelligence and the 
Under-Prepared Student As “Other”, 61 J. legAl educ. 264, 271 (2011) (“Of course, most legal 
reasoning skills and at least case briefing are taught explicitly at most law schools in separate 
legal research and writing and ‘lawyering’ courses. Typically, however, neither faculty nor 
students consider the skills learned in these courses as transferrable to their doctrinal classes. 
In addition, some academic skills, such as close case reading and note taking, and some legal 
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Langdell’s case method is one that exemplifies formalist approaches to the 
law.58 Viewing the completeness of the common law tradition, in-class inquiry 
into scientifically discovering the law through the Socratic dialogue often 
loads the examination with only a limited set of skills, mostly those dominated 
by analogical and syllogistic reasoning.59 As Philip Kissam has observed, there 
is a tendency for “the discipline’s subtle promotion of a particular intellectual 
method at the cost of devaluing other intellectual methods that in legal 
practices will complement and at times compete with the favored method.”60 
According to Kissam, that “favored method is the method of analysis, that is 
the mental practice and instinct of breaking things down and dividing them 
into many small discrete and useful parts”61 and that “[o]ne consequence of 
the discipline’s analytical tendency is the tacit disfavoring of other intellectual 
methods such as the interpretation or synthesis of complex legal materials and 
construction of complex or novel legal arguments.”62 Such favoring of one 
“intellectual method” is read by Kissam as a “devaluation” that he notes as 
“worrisome.”63 
Similarly, Robin West has also characterized the kind of limited analytical 
and reasoning skills that law schools teach to the exclusion of others, calling 
out in particular two types of reasoning—first, “processual fairness,” where 
students recognize processes in the law that utilize a sense of basic fairness to 
accomplish legal goals,64 and, second, “horizontal equity,” where students learn 
how to analyze cases analogically to treat like cases alike.65  Overemphasis of 
these two types of analysis contributes to the teaching of a kind of “legalism” 
that West claims is detrimental because it overshadows the ability of students 
to sense other things about the law, such as justice.66 
Both Kissam and West’s views on the analytical skills taught in the Langdell 
case method appear as a self-contained (and perhaps overly self-confident) set 
of skills that cabined by the nature of the case method. West notes openly 
reasoning skills, such as issue spotting, tend to be overlooked, even in courses with a skills 
focus.” (citations omitted)).
58. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Legal Education and Professional Skills: Myths and Misconceptions 
About Theory and Practice, 45 mcgeorge l. rev. 7 (2013).
59. See Nancy Cook, Law As Science: Revisiting Langdell’s Paradigm in the 21st Century, 88 n.d. l. rev. 
21, 34 (2012) (describing how “Socratic questioning provides students with opportunities 
to draw distinctions and analogies, reconcile apparently inconsistent judgments, and make 
judgments about the soundness of legal reasoning”).
60. kissAm, supra note 8, at 6. 
61. Id.
62. Id. (citations omitted).
63. See id.
64. wesT, supra note 18, at 48-50.
65. Id. at 50.
66. See id. at 51-55.  
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that “pedagogically, formalists viewed legal education as an education in 
the virtues and content of the common law:  by reading hundreds of cases 
in every common law subject, and nothing else, the student would come 
to learn through immersion, both the content of the law and the art of its 
interpretation.”67 In this way, Langdell’s case method for studying law, as West 
has hermetically described it, would presuppose that a limited set of analytical 
skills would prevail even if a student had to take on novel issues in the law.68 
For if all the legal principles and truths required by the law are preserved in the 
body of cases that we have inherited from the common law, then even disputes 
arising under cases of first impression, involving never-been-seen-before facts, 
only need a look back at the right precedence—using the predominant set of 
analytical skills—for a contemporary resolution.69 Perhaps this notion is the 
same “devaluation” that worries Kissam.70 
Another analytical or critical reasoning skill that is emphasized, perhaps to 
the exclusion of others, is logic upon which the law is built.71 The satisfaction 
of mastery here brings a sense of accomplishment and intellectual rigorousness 
that exaggeratedly justifies its prominence.72 But otherwise, the Socratic 
inquiry and teaching of case law reduces examination of skills from what could 
be a fuller pantheon of legal reasoning skills that could reflect a modern-day 
concept of law practice to a formalist bundle of skills that mirror the vogue of 
former law thinking and an incomplete image of law and law practice.73  
67. Id. at 74 n.70. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. at 101-02 (describing how in Langdell’s ideals, “Law simply is that body of principles 
that comes to us from the past, making possible the full resolution of all possible legal 
questions.” and that “[f]or that to be possible, the principles by which novel questions are 
answered must be a full and complete set, and must be inferable from well-settled texts and 
those well-settled texts are virtually by necessity common law cases.”).
70. See kissAm, supra note 8, at 6 (“This devaluation appears, for example, in the apparent passion 
of many lawyers for focusing on the details of things without providing any conceptual or 
ethical understanding of their actions and statements.”).
71. Andrea Kayne Kaufman, The Logician Versus the Linguist—An Empirical Tale of Functional Discrimination 
in the Legal Academy, 8 mich. J. gender & l. 247, 252-53 (2001) (“Most law schools emphasize 
logical intelligence in the evaluation of students as well. Many first-year courses evaluate 
students using standard bluebook examinations. These timed tests require students to ‘issue 
spot’ and apply the holdings of appellate decisions from their case books to a complex set 
of facts and to use the logic of precedential reasoning to predict possible legal outcomes.  
This logical testing has been criticized for ignoring the importance of creative synthesis and 
‘legal imagination,’ disregarding ‘practical judgments,’ and ‘not adequately reflect[ing] all 
the types of intelligence that the successful lawyer needs.’ While ignored by a significant 
proportion of law school education, particularly the first-year courses, the other intelligences 
are integral to the varied and multifaceted roles of lawyering.”) (citing Philip C. Kissam, Law 
School Examinations, 42 vAnd. l. rev. 433, 456-57 (1989)). 
72. See wesT, supra note 18, at 56 (“Law schools inculcate in students an appreciation for the 
importance of evenhanded treatment under law[.]”). 
73. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing from the 
MacCrate Report—of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 wAsh. l. rev. 593, 595 (1994) 
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Other than limited analytical skills, Kissam also suggests that law schools 
teach narrowly the skills peripheral to legal reasoning, such as reading 
and writing that are fundamental to lawyering: “The discipline teaches 
instrumentalist habits of reading and writing that both empower and limit 
future lawyers. These habits consist of quick, productive but often superficial 
ways of reading legal texts and writing about law[.]”74 More specifically, 
Kissam says “[s]tudents must engage in quick if superficial analysis and 
write precisely but quickly, especially if they hope to obtain one of the few 
high grades that are allowed by grading curves.”75 Oral rhetoric, as noted 
by Kissam and others, is another heavily emphasized lawyering skill that is 
taught at the exclusion of other, more transactional lawyering skills, and that 
reaffirms the doctrine-skills hierarchy created by the Langdellian preference 
for case law.76 Elizabeth Mertz has noted as well the oral rhetoric emphasis 
and what is conveyed and accomplished by it in law classrooms—all of which 
filtered directly into our established pedagogical traditions.77 These different 
observations of the limited skills set taught in law schools suggest that skills 
teaching has strong ties to the way in which the case method studies the law, 
but that focusing too much on such a small set of skills imparts only a partial 
impression of the experience of law practice.
The lack of awareness of how legal knowledge is transferred to practice in the 
face of hierarchy of form over skills sets up a faulty (or negligible) dichotomy 
for law students when they enter into the real world of law firms and clients.78 
(mentioning “the false dualism of so-called intellectual rigor in legal ideas and ‘science’ and 
the presumed ‘weakness’ of skills training by demonstrating that both theory and skills are 
‘legal science’ and rigorous, and both are also incomplete and partial statements of what a 
lawyer needs to know.”).
74. kissAm, supra note 8, at 7.
75. Id. at 55.
76. See id. at 7 (mentioning how law school discipline emphasize habits indicative of “[t]he law 
school’s distinctive oral culture, which celebrates oral heroism and tacitly devalues complex 
reading and writing.”).
77. See merTZ, supra note 38, at 94 (summarizing how students in law schools “are being trained 
to a common language: a new kind of reading, writing, and talking” that is structured in a 
way that “relies on constant filtering of conflicting stories through the lens of legal-textual 
authority.”).  
78. See Anne Marie Cavazos, Next Phase Pedagogy Reform for the Twenty-First Century Legal Education: 
Delivering Competent Lawyers for a Consumer-Driven Market, 45 conn. l. rev. 1113, 1144-45 (2012) 
(“Since the late 1800s and early 1900s, legal education has been centered on theoretical 
and historical education rather than a combination of a theory/history and skill-oriented 
education model. This focus has produced many problems. When legal education shifted 
away from apprenticeships, law students were no longer being taught how to apply legal 
knowledge to resolve practical problems. In addition, law graduates may lack the ability to 
understand social problems and assist clients holistically by moving away from specialization 
of subject matter that limits legal education. Cross-training students in legal areas and 
equipping them to be responsive to the client’s non-legal concerns is imperative in today’s 
society. To promote higher competency of law students upon graduation, a skills-oriented 
pedagogy must be integrated into legal education so that a hands-on or clinical approach is 
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Making this observation at a time when those examining the new normal are 
finding that the student competency with skills—even academic skills—are at an 
all-time low requires a need for transfer of learning to demonstrate and impart 
skills in the classroom, particularly through active learning experiences.79 What 
would result otherwise is a limited engagement with practice in the classroom 
for our students.
In education theory, scholarly discussion about curricula in different learning 
settings has included ways to set up curricula that facilitate how knowledge 
acquired in the classroom transfers into the skills development of outside the 
classroom.80 In that regard, the Langdellian model underserves rather than 
underscores this transfer. If the traditional law school curriculum remains 
exclusively knowledge-driven,81 then there will be limited opportunities for 
transfer of skills development in a career that depends more on the practice 
than the acquisition of knowledge.82 It is probably impossible for law schools 
to accommodate the hyperbolic level of practice-readiness that the profession 
has demanded.83 No three-year program can inculcate students for every law 
practice permutation so that they will be a workforce of covert and seasoned 
attorneys on their first day of practice, and to buy into this notion is foolhardy.84 
offered from day one.”).
79. See Gerald F. Hess, Principle 3: Good Practice Encourages Active Learning, 49 J. legAl educ. 401, 402 
(1999) (“[A]ctive learning is more than a set of techniques. It is also an orientation on the 
part of students and teachers. It includes a belief that legal education should help students 
understand legal concepts and theory, improve critical thinking, and develop professional 
skills and values. It seeks to focus students not only on what they are learning but how they 
are learning as well. Finally, an active learning orientation proceeds from the assumption 
that students learn best when they take responsibility for their own education.” (citations 
omitted)). 
80. See generally Kowalski, supra note 51, at 68-77 (discussing the different models of learning and 
their effectiveness in creating transfer of knowledge to the student and how such studies 
would impact the law school model, which Kowalski identifies as a model that would fall 
within a classical approach).  
81. See Timothy W. Floyd, Legal Education and the Vision Thing, 31 gA. l. rev. 853, 855 (1996) (“At 
most law schools the curriculum and pedagogy appear to embody a belief in one of two 
purposes: either to teach students a body of knowledge, that is, the ‘law’; or to teach students 
a certain type of analysis called ‘thinking like lawyers.’”).
82. See id. at 856 (“The basic law school curriculum, however, still largely ignores the practice 
of law. The current curriculum does not give students much of a picture of the world of law 
practice.”).
83. James E. Moliterno, A Way Forward for an Ailing Legal Education Model, 17 chAP. l. rev. 73, 76 
(2013) (in describing reforms at Washington and Lee School of Law the term “practice-ready” 
is tempered as an end-goal expectation: “The ‘practice-ready’ term has been thrown around 
a lot and I think it is too high a hurdle for any law school to expect to leap. It is unrealistic to 
think that a three-year JD can produce law graduates who are like third-, fourth-, or fifth-year 
attorneys. That is not going to happen in the time we have and with the resources we have. 
But we can give students a head start on their development.”).
84. Perhaps a more realistic solution to the competency training of students has been the rise of 
law school incubators, which are still experimental at this time. See Genevieve Blake Tung, 
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However, it is not impossible to help students develop skills of legal reasoning 
and even gain some practice-based experience that allows them to transition 
into a life in the law more smoothly—in essence to transfer knowledge into 
practice. In short, the new normative within legal education, regardless of 
what model we use, is to invite active learning experiences that coincide both 
with the theoretical and practical concepts of the law—active learning that 
evens out the playing field between doctrine and skills.85
In writing about transfer of learning in the law school context, Tonya 
Kowalski draws from educational theories about transfer of learning to 
observe that to facilitate transfer the instructor must understand that the 
knowledge imparted in law schools should encompass more than just doctrinal 
legal knowledge.86 Kowalski explains that the knowledge we teach should 
also be procedural, strategic, and conditional, and then she describes them 
accordingly:87 
Procedural knowledge is simply “how-to” knowledge. Students learn how to 
formulate an IRAC analysis, how to file and serve a complaint, how to brief 
a case, and even how to outline and study for exams. Strategic knowledge 
focuses on understanding our own mental processes, such as how to acquire 
new information and skills. For legal education, this can be expanded to 
include strategic thinking about research, reasoning, advocacy, negotiation, 
and client relations. Finally, conditional knowledge is the experience and 
understanding to know what types of knowledge are called for in varied 
contexts.88   
All of these kinds of non-doctrinal knowledge serve functional needs for the 
law student to become the active professional; and therein lies the importance 
of transfer.
To accomplish transfer while we still adhere to the Langdellian tradition is to 
subvert the hierarchy of form over function. It is possible if we can expand the 
pedagogy of teaching law students to embrace a method that enables transfer 
of learning that results in students acquiring the law and then knowing what 
to do with it more effectively.89 A fundamental transition in the model of law 
teaching and learning90 should, of course, strive for actively teaching practice 
Academic Law Libraries and the Crisis in Legal Education, 105 lAw libr. J. 275, 297-99 (2013). 
85. See sTuckey eT Al., supra note 1, at 132-33 (advocating that effective teaching in law schools 
should be more “multi-modal” and less reliant on Socratic and case method dialogues). 
86. See Kowalski, supra note 51, at 81 (“The required knowledge base includes not only rote and 
critically reflective understanding, but also other forms of knowledge . . . .”).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 64 (proposing that students can reap benefits from seeing the kinds of transferable 
knowledge and active learning skills that are emphasized in the transfer method of learning).
90. See Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 19, at 227 (“Change is coming; the only choice for legal 
educators is whether they will act early and creatively enough to make the post-Langdellian 
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alongside teaching knowledge without the impediment of a false hierarchy 
that marginalizes one component over another in the life of the law.91 Still 
for now, while we wait for the new normal to be defined,92 there are ways of 
bringing skills acquisition into the law classroom that avoids having to combat 
institutional grievances head-on and manages to further a coup d’état over the 
dominance of form. The rest of this article will explain such a method.
III. Destablizing The Hierarchy, or Succotash over Steak
On the morning of April 4, 2014, just before the Igniting Law Teaching 
conference was to begin, a colleague from another law school who had sat 
through my run-through during rehearsal commented on how my idea for 
expanding active learning in my doctrinal classes reminded her of the 
sneaky ways a parent would try to hide fruits and vegetables onto a finicky 
child’s dinner plate. Yet skills—like succotash—need not be given a position 
subordinate to meat or doctrinal knowledge in the balance of all things related 
to competency. And so, the goal of my method is to elevate skills teaching so 
that it rises closer to the level of doctrinal teaching while making sure that 
the elevation escapes detection—resulting in an invisible blend of both so that 
students, finicky or not, do not realize that they are acquiring skills at the same 
time they are learning the law, or are not bothered by it if they do. Instead, 
the blend of both skills and doctrinal knowledge in the classroom should be 
seamless—lest they figure out what they are getting and then decide, based on 
their previous biases, to excise skills learning to their yet-unrealized detriments. 
To so do, I have taken a page from those who teach law school academic 
support and deal with the doctrine-skills hierarchy in their jobs daily, but who 
try to avoid breaking the golden rule of academic support etiquette—a rule that, 
if it does not exemplify hierarchy, at least displays territoriality. When I began 
teaching in law school as an academic support instructor, one of the towering 
rules to obey, for better or worse, was to avoid treading on the domain of the 
doctrinal law professors as far as what to teach to students in academic support 
courses.93 Of course, this rule shows the divide (or hierarchy) between skills 
law school an improvement in terms of the quality of education provided—i.e., to make 
it a law school that finally remedies the deficiencies that Reed and his successors have 
highlighted for almost a century.”).
91. See sTuckey eT Al., supra note 1, at 73 (“Law schools cannot prepare students for practice 
unless they teach doctrine, theory, and practice as part of a unified, coordinated program of 
instruction.” (citation omitted)).  
92. See, e.g., Jan Bissett & Margi Heinen, Facing the New Normal, 92 mich. b.J. 52 (2013); Philip J. 
Weiser, Professionalism and the New Normal, 42 colo. lAw. 49 (2013).
93. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Academic Support at the Crossroads: From Minority Retention to Bar Prep and 
Beyond—Will Academic Support Change Legal Education or Itself Be Fundamentally Changed?, 73 umkc 
l. rev. 497, 504-05 (2004) (describing that in many law schools, “academic support 
professionals know they must be careful not to appear as if they are encroaching into the 
domain of the doctrinal faculty, especially avoiding being viewed as attempting to interfere 
with the classroom of the doctrinal faculty.” (citations omitted)).
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and knowledge among faculty,94 but also it reflects pedagogical values as well.95 
In other words, tasked with having to be both complementary and effective, 
academic support instructors teach skills that deal with the law and not the 
legal knowledge of it.96 For this, many professors who teach academic support 
often build access points in their academic support courses where they leave 
the doctrine untouched, but instruct on the practice of law or on a skill of legal 
reasoning to enhance student competency in doctrinal courses.97 My approach 
today varies from this restriction to doctrine in a much more liberated sense. 
What my particular borrowing from academic support practices has rendered 
is a three-step approach for elevating skills with doctrine in my law courses. 
It is an approach that has helped me find, examine, and develop those access 
points and work them into the doctrinal narrative of my courses to facilitate 
teaching and learning the law alongside skills—or sometimes even through 
them. In its more or less laboratory incantation, the three steps to elevating 
skills into the doctrinal classroom require the instructor to (1) find a connection 
between legal reasoning skills and doctrine (what I call mimesis), (2) ensure 
the relevance of the skill, and (3) build an opportunity in the classroom for 
students to discover both skills and doctrine. I will explain these steps in detail 
accordingly.
A. Step One: Discovering Mimesis
The first step in elevating skills seamlessly to match the concentration of 
doctrinal teaching is to find a particular connection between a certain doctrine 
and a legal reasoning skill that could be used to practice it. Here the instructor 
searches for ways that the doctrine displays itself through a particular skill set. 
I call this mimesis—borrowing the term from literary and critical traditions to 
distill the process of finding a quality in the way the law is presented, whether 
in its content or context, that has potential to be imitative or “mimetic” of a 
particular aspect of lawyering—i.e., skill. 
The term “mimesis”—without waxing too metaphysically over it—has been 
defined within aesthetics as a concept in language and art that characterizes 
94. See id. at 499 (“However, at its core academic support has the potential to threaten existing 
hierarchies in legal education.”) (citing Kristine Knaplund & Richard H. Sander, The Art and 
Science of Academic Support, 45 J. legAl educ. 157, 159 (1995)).
95. See id. at 500-01 (“While overlap exists between the goals and methods of traditional 
legal education and academic support, the two models present significant differences in 
philosophy and approach. Furthermore, in many respects, academic support directly 
challenges the soundness of much of the pedagogy of traditional legal education as well 
as the fairness and propriety of making students adapt to one fairly standard model of 
teaching.” (citations omitted)).
96. See id. at 504-05.
97. See, e.g., Adam G. Todd, Exam Writing as Legal Writing: Teaching and Critiquing Law School 
Examination Discourse, 76 TemP. l. rev. 69 (2003) (recognizing the “status quo” that is the 
constructed hierarchy between skills and doctrinal instruction in legal education and 
advocating for legal writing courses to embrace academic support teaching of exam writing 
to help further student competency).
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both the imitation of nature as object, phenomenon, and process, and more 
broadly as a form of artistic representation.98 For this method, I resort to the 
former definition and not the latter, looking toward the intertextuality between 
the law that is presented and a skill (or skills) that would usher that law into 
reality, meaning practice. Because law is fundamentally language-based,99 and 
mimesis has been a concept that has partially dealt with the gestures of language 
in imitating nature,100 mimesis does have its place in the interpretation of law 
and in observing the performative aspects of practicing the law,101 essentially 
accomplishing what the law represented by language intends to do. In the 
broadest sense, the performative aspect of the law is easiest to glean from what 
the law can do to individuals.102 But the performativity of the law can, as I see 
it, also have implications for those who practice the law as well.
But theory aside, in this first step, what the law teacher must ask herself 
in relation to a particular legal doctrine that she is about to teach can be 
articulated much more simply: Does the law, or the way it is often presented, exhibit a 
practical or legal reasoning skill for examination? In other words, through a discovery 
of mimesis I consider the nature of a doctrine or how presentation of that 
doctrine avails itself particularly to showing us some sort of skill. Again, the 
idea of the law exhibiting some mimetic attributes for instruction should 
not be entirely unfamiliar—as, arguably, Langdell’s idea that the common 
law tradition was a complete and autonomous system was itself a mimetic 
observation imprinted into the way Langdell designed law instruction.103 The 
difference might be that Langdell’s formalist vision might have prompted an 
outmoded or arguably incomplete characterization that then trickled into the 
98. See erich AuerbAch, mimesis: The rePresenTATion of reAliTy in wesTern liTerATure 
11-12, 23  (Willard Trask trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2003) (1974).
99. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 hArv. l. rev. 457, 459-60 (1896) (“The 
law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language continually 
invites us to pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it, as we are sure to do 
unless we have the boundary constantly before our minds.”).
100. See Arne melberg, Theories of mimesis 21-23 (1995).
101. See Martha Merrill Umphrey, Law in Drag: Trials and Legal Performativity, 21 colum. J. gender 
& l. 114 (2011) (discussing performativity in the practice of law).
102. See generally kenJi yoshino, covering: The hidden AssAulT on our civil righTs (2006).
103. See Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to Posner and 
Schlag, 28 ind. l. rev. 353, 360 (1994) (explaining the logical flow of Langdell’s ideas about 
law and legal studies: “If law could be a science, then legal studies could be approached 
from the ‘scientific perspective’ required for laboratory experiments testing the validity of 
a hypothesis. Law professors, following Langdell’s vision of legal science, could claim that 
the law could be analyzed as a system consisting of a set of universal principles, policies, and 
rules. The reduction of law to scientific concepts systematized by an abstract general method 
also rendered legal apprenticeship largely obsolete as a means for professional law training, 
since it was now thought that law students no longer needed to study law as a practice; all 
that one needed was a classroom, casebooks, and a teacher trained in the Socratic method of 
instruction.” (citations omitted)).
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way law has been since taught.104 By contrast, the method here for identifying 
mimesis is not infiltrated by that kind of broad ambitious vision, but examines 
and mines each teachable doctrine microscopically for teachable skills that 
help bring that doctrine to life in practice and closer to transfer of doctrinal 
knowledge.
Not only does finding such a pairing help identify the interrelatedness 
between a particular legal knowledge and some type of lawyerly skill, but 
it is also the key to knowing where the access points begin for skills. For 
instance, in Contracts, a complex rule that is presented in statutory form, such 
as the dreaded section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code105—otherwise 
known as the “battle of the forms,106 imparts very noticeable opportunities for 
teaching students the importance of statutory reading and interpretation. The 
way that section 2-207 is hermetically presented, with its three subsections,107 
while allowing many different scenarios to be reached during the formation 
of modern commercial deal making, gives the instructor opportunity to 
teach the doctrine by explicitly teaching skills of statutory interpretation and 
construction—especially while negotiating among the language of section 
2-207, its official comments,108 and some pertinent fact patterns involving 
contract making.
In addition, the level of technicality within section 2-207 affords another 
moment of mimesis for teaching a subsequent lesson, particularly for success 
104. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 563-68 (describing legal realist responses to 
Langdell’s formalism and case method).
105. “§ 2-207 (1)-(3). Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
     (1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation 
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms 
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly 
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
 (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
 (b) they materially alter it; or
 (c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within 
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is 
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise 
establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on 
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated 
under any other provisions of this Act. UCC § 2-207(1)-(3).” 
106. See Colin P. Marks, Not What, But When Is an Offer: Rehabilitating the Rolling Contract, 46 conn. l. 
rev. 73, 80-81 (2013) (“Legal realism, also called neo-classicism, abandons contract law as a 
rigid set of rules in favor of a softer approach that tries to understand how contracts work in 
the real world. Legal realism is at the heart of provisions such as U.C.C. section 2-207’s battle 
of the forms, which departed from the common law’s mirror image rule approach to offers 
and counter-offers.”) (citations omitted).
107. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1)-(3), supra note 105. 
108. See U.C.C. § 2-207, Official Comments (2000).
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on law school exams. Such rule-driven technicality with section 2-207 works 
well for testing the doctrine through multiple-choice questions—since multiple-
choice questions lend themselves easily to testing technically dense rules and 
concepts109—and therefore, showing students how to handle multiple-choice 
exams in law school. Here then, we see the presentation of the law (i.e., statutory 
material) translates into an opportunity for teaching legal competency skills 
(i.e., statutory reading and interpretation) that has further potential to be 
filtered into problem-solving skills for a particular testing format (multiple-
choice exams).
The transfer here from legal knowledge to exam taking is reminiscent of the 
plight of the lawyer who must internalize the law and then practice in various 
settings, whether in the courtroom, in written analysis, or in transactional 
situations. Also, this resembles very much the procedural and conditional 
knowledge in Haskell’s transfer theory as Kowalski has articulated.110 Likewise, 
a first-year Torts course could also feature a less complicated but a similar 
example of mimesis by examining section 402A in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, the provision governing strict liability for harm caused by sellers,111 
where the instructor could show students how to break down the two difficult 
subprovisions into a set of required elements that are more easily manageable 
for a lawyer to graft onto a set of facts. Instead of  teaching multiple-choice test-
taking skills here, however, the lesson on 402A here could be used to teach 
students how to organize and “deconstruct” even complex rule provisions into 
simpler bite-size pieces for thorough analysis and organization on an essay 
exam.
Another illustration of mimesis here can be seen in a first-year Criminal 
Law course, where the use of common law rule for burglary often requires the 
ability for simple rule synthesis. The element of felonious intent in burglary 
requires the practitioner to synthesize rules from a felonious crime generally.112 
Two observations for teaching skills can be taught from this illustration. First, 
the combination of a rule for a property crime has to be paired accurately with 
a rule for a specific-intent felony for it to be correctly used for issue spotting 
and analyzing a set of facts for burglary. So a rule synthesis lesson can be given, 
involving rules for battery and a specific-intent felony and even the use and 
combination of different case law precedence within those rules. Second, there 
is also an opportunity for teaching more broadly the complex relationships of 
rules and cases and the importance of synthesizing rules with demonstrative 
cases quickly.113 Although legal writing courses teach rule synthesis explicitly, 
109. See Janet W. Fisher, Multiple-Choice: Choosing the Best Options for More Effective and Less Frustrating Law 
School Testing, 37 cAP. u. l. rev. 119, 122-23 (2008) (“Law school multiple-choice questions, 
by contrast, are intended to test mastery of legal rules and concepts.”).
110. See Kowalski, supra note 51, at 81.
111. resTATemenT (second) of TorTs § 402A (1965).
112. chArles e. TorciA, 3 whArTon’s criminAl lAw § 316 (15th ed. 1993). 
113. See, e.g., deborAh A. schmedemAnn & chrisTinA l. kunZ, synThesis: legAl reAding, 
675Function, Form, and Strawberries
it helps students to see the same skill working in a doctrinal course to reinforce 
the importance of acquiring such skills.114 
Further, the vagueness in the drafting or presentation of a doctrine can 
also offer several mimetic observations about legal practice and reasoning. For 
instance, in Torts, the phrase “offensive contact”—an element in a seemingly 
simple battery rule115—offers a lot of opportunity to play with the facts. 
Students must learn to closely read and argue from a set of facts to see whether 
a series of events could contextualize an act to become a touching that would 
be reasonably offensive. Developing a methodology for closely reading facts 
based on a relatively vague rule could prove helpful. For example:  
A suffers from a heart condition and frequently takes nitroglycerin pills to 
open his arteries and relieve angina pain. B, A’s attendant, seeking to hasten 
A’s death, places a book on A’s night table blocking A’s view so that he cannot 
easily find his nitro pills. A awakes in the middle of the night suffering chest 
pain and cannot locate his pills. Minutes later he suffers a heart attack and 
dies. Has B committed an intentional tort?116
Could the heart attack caused in part by B’s act of intentionally placing the 
book with the desire to hasten death be an offensive touching for battery? 
Certainly B’s moving of the book was an intentional physical act that set in 
motion some sort of eventual harm (a heart attack, which physiologically 
could be argued as a contact by persuasively characterizing such symptoms 
accordingly, or at least an attempt could be made to do so117).
Similarly, in Constitutional Law, the vagueness of rules and terms of art 
and the change from one position to the complete opposite in Supreme 
Court precedence can show students much about broadening and narrowing 
holdings, but also much about the interplay between rules and policymaking.118 
A good example could be with some of the canonical civil rights cases such 
reAsoning, And wriTing 36-42 (2007).
114. See Paul Figley, Teaching Rule Synthesis with Real Cases, 61 J. legAl educ. 245, 245 (2011) 
(describing the different classroom contexts in which rule synthesis can be used—from 
doctrinal courses to clinics).
115. resTATemenT (second) of TorTs § 18 (1965). 
116. AAron d. Twerski eT Al., TorTs: cAses And mATeriAls 67-68 (3d ed. 2012).
117. The Mayo Clinic lists compression in the chest as, inter alia, one of the symptoms of a heart 
attack: “This discomfort or pain can feel like a tight ache, pressure, fullness, or squeezing 
in your chest lasting more than a few minutes.” mAyo clinic, Heart Attack Symptoms: Know 
What’s a Medical Emergency, (Jul. 25, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/
heart-attack/in-depth/heart-attack-symptoms/art-20047744.
118. See roberT c. Power, sTrATegies And Techniques for TeAching consTiTuTionAl lAw 14 
(2012). 
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as Plessy v. Ferguson119 and Brown v. Board of Education,120 or Bowers v. Hardwick121 and 
Lawrence v. Texas.122 The presentation of the law in those cases reflects broader 
adjudicative and interpretative skills at play.
A final example of identifying mimesis is in the way the professor organizes 
an entire body of law. The way doctrine and concepts are organized together 
in a law course affords opportunities for skills development, whether it is 
acquiring a knack for seeing subjects at the big-picture level or understanding 
that the ability to conceptualize and organize a body of doctrine for a course 
helps facilitate issue-spotting skills in practice.123 If a semester long course in 
Torts is already organized by levels of culpability from purpose, desire, or 
substantial certainty to a complete abandonment of intent (i.e., intentional 
torts, negligence, strict liability, etc.),124 the topical nature of the course can 
help a student spot a civil wrong and categorize it according to the appropriate 
doctrine. A year-long Contracts course could be organized in a way that 
exemplifies the linearity of contract claims (e.g., formation, breach, and 
damages) to help students recognize that some bodies of substantive law could 
be organized and learned within a progressive, linear narrative. In these ways, 
the presentation of the law transfers mimetically into ways students see such 
issues arise in reality. This same example translates particularly well for upper-
level capstone courses that may yoke two different subjects in an advanced 
way, such as a course on the law of Remedies, which tries to discuss topics on 
damages, equity, and restitution within torts and contracts subjects.125 As we 
have seen here, the law by the way it is presented through language is very 
fruitful in showing us the relationships to skills in the mode of practice and 
demonstrating the critical use of mimesis in potential lessons pairing skills 
and law.
B. Step Two: Finding Relevance
According to adult learning theory, adult learners tend to capture material 
more readily and effectively if they find that there is some relevance to the 
119. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
120. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
121. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
122. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
123. See, e.g., Dannye Holley, Specific Course and Class Planning Ideas: #1 Using the Syllabus as Course 
Synthesis and Teaching Plan, in gerAld f. hess & sTeven friedlAnd, Techniques for TeAching 
lAw 29 (1999).
124. See, e.g., mArshAll s. shAPo & richArd J. PelTZ, TorT And inJury lAw vii-xii (3d. ed. 2006). 
The Table of Contents in Shapo & Peltz organizes the major torts according to culpability 
standards.  
125. See Caprice L. Roberts, Teaching Remedies from Theory to Practice, 57 sT. louis u. l.J. 713, 713 
(2012) (“Remedies is about the intersection of things. Intellectual curiosity has always drawn 
me to wonder how different, disparate things fit together. The Remedies course provides an 
analytical framework to explore the varied goals of substantive doctrinal courses. It shows 
how bodies of law connect.”).
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material.126 Examples from literature on legal writing and clinical teaching 
reiterate how “[a]ccording to adult learning theory, students generally 
learn more effectively when they understand what they are supposed to be 
learning and how it will help them achieve personal goals.”127 The concept 
of incorporating relevance seems intuitive and commonsensical if students 
understands the “why” part of their learning experience and process and 
can relate or find the purpose of the lesson useful, then they will receive that 
instruction and learning with more weight.128
With that in mind, the theory behind the second step in my method is 
to elevate skills acquisition in the doctrinal classroom by exemplifying the 
relevance of skill to facilitate the previous step’s mimesis. In proceeding to 
step two, I always evaluate whether the mimesis that I have located in step 
one is helpful to my students currently in their careers in law school—for 
understanding or learning doctrine or doing well in classes—or relevant for 
lawyering in general. The prevalence of the millennial generation as law 
students today, where just-in-time learning overshadows the just-in-case 
learning habits of previous generations,129 prompts me to ensure that the legal 
reasoning skills identified in the first step are timely for teaching to students in 
my classes. If not, then I may abandon the lesson entirely and look for another 
mimetic exchange between doctrine and skill, or I may look deeper to find a 
hidden, subterranean connection to relevance that is not as readily apparent 
at first glance. 
For many introductory first-year courses, students who are caught off-guard 
by having to deal with the legal gray areas of factual scenarios could easily 
feel trepidation in classes. Extending the mimesis discussed above to the 
vagueness of the language in “offensive contact” in a simple battery rule, the 
student learning to deal with that vagueness would appreciate their relevance 
if an instructor makes it clear that such gray areas help lawyers make creative 
arguments. A lesson in Torts that draws on this mimesis and conveys relevance 
126. See mAlcolm s. knowles eT Al., The AdulT leArner: The definiTive clAssic in AdulT 
educATion And humAn resource develoPmenT 48 (7th ed. 2012) (“A person learns significantly 
only those things that he perceives as being involved in the maintenance of, or enhancement of, the structure of self. 
This hypothesis underlines the importance of making the learning relevant to the learner, 
and puts into question the academic tradition of required courses.”).
127. Kele Stewart, How Much Clinic for How Many Students?: Examining the Decision to Offer Clinics for One 
Semester or An Academic Year, 5 J. mArshAll l.J. 1, 52 (2011).
128. See Linda S. Anderson, Incorporating Adult Learning Theory into Law School Classrooms: Small Steps 
Leading to Large Results, 5 APPAlAchiAn J.L. 127, 143 (“According to those who have devoted 
significant study to effective education, students learn more effectively when they can 
see how what they are doing will be relevant to achieving their goals. Our students are 
pragmatic. They are generally willing to work hard if they can see why they must do so 
and what the benefit is to them. If they must learn specific skills in order to understand 
more complex tasks, they are willing to do this, as long as we tell them why it is necessary.”) 
(citations omitted).
129. See Joan C. Bohl, Generations X and Y in Law School: Practical Strategies for Teaching the MTV/Google 
Generation, 54 loy. l. rev. 775, 781 (2008).
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of the skills taught could involve a doctrinal lesson that shows how the rule for 
battery extends the requirement of offensive contact to include contact not just 
directly of a person’s body, but of an item closely identified with a person’s 
body, such as a portable but nondescript item, a pen or a plate.130 What the 
mimesis here conveys is a need for skills to utilize the vagueness and work 
through it to resolve a case.131
Another lesson in offensive touching of a person might be the ability to 
use policy arguments to bolster the interpretation of a rule and its application.132 
If the policy behind such a rule is to prevent unwanted violations of personal 
space,133 then showing students how to match that policy with the rule to skew 
the rule more favorably for one side might not only help them acquire a skill 
of characterizing the law in situations where things could possibly go either 
way, but also it might be a relevant skill for first-year Torts students who are 
just starting to understand that part of a lawyer’s job is to find ambiguities and 
then comfortably and creatively resolve them.
The above example of section 2-207 of the U.C.C is also helpful in this part 
for explaining relevance.134 In an Evidence course, where a professor might 
organize the separate legal doctrines as a series of legal threshold hurdles 
building on each other to ensure the ultimate admissibility of an evidentiary 
item, such presentation connotes to students a premium on transferring 
doctrine to practice, and the relevance of that skill for an attorney who must 
make litigation moves on the fly.135 In Civil Procedure, a lesson on personal 
jurisdiction could also coincide with a demonstration of how factor-driven 
tests are different from elemental rules in the way lawyers use them not only 
help students learn the factors of “minimum contacts” but also how to use 
130. resTATemenT (second) of TorTs §§ 18, 19 (1965). 
131. A classic widely taught case here is Fisher v. Carousel Motor Hotel, 424 S.W. 2d 627 (Tex. 
1967) where a restaurant manager’s confiscation of a plate from the grip of an African-
American engineer at the buffet line paired with epithets was considered an offensive contact 
with an object that is closely identified with the body.
132. See id. at 629-30 (resorting to resTATemenT (second) of TorTs § 18, Cmt. at 31, to articulate 
a plausible rationale for characterizing the plate as a closely-identified item with the body). 
133. See id.
134. Mary Kate Kearney & Mary Jane Kearney, Reflections on Good (Law) Teaching, 2001 l. rev. 
m.s.u.-d.c.l. 835, 840 (2001) (discussing how skills of statutory reading are “essential” for 
success in law practice).
135. For an example of a discussion regarding the organization of an Evidence course that has 
skills implications, see, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Organization of the Evidence Course: The 
“Preliminaries” to Helping Students Develop the Skill of Identifying Nonhearsay, 50 sT. louis univ. l. J. 
1047, 1060 (2005) (“[T]he fundamental question is which sequence of coverage makes the 
most sense pedagogically. The premise of [the] Article is that the most daunting challenge 
for the Evidence teacher is to help students develop the analytic skill of differentiating 
between hearsay and nonhearsay. On that premise, it may be wiser to position the hearsay 
rule a bit later in the course. More specifically, before taking up the hearsay rule, it seems 
advisable to cover topics which will give the students understandings and skills that will 
later enable them to more effectively meet the challenge of identifying nonhearsay.”). 
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facts and the law to weigh out factors for one side or other. Such a skills lesson 
that occurs immediately in time alongside explanation of the doctrine helps 
students see the relevance for developing an ability to reason with factors that 
differs from reasoning with elemental requirements.
Finally, not only can the relevance be tied to some aspect pertinent to legal 
reasoning or lawyering, but the relevance can be associated with an aspect of 
improvement or success in law school itself.136 Test-taking skills, such as the 
example from the previous section using 2-207 to teach multiple-choice testing 
and studying strategies, would be especially relevant alongside doctrine in the 
first-semester of law school.137 Even if the relevance of the skills identified in the 
mimesis might be remote, one might draw out a relevance that corresponds to 
student success in the class. One could do this by externalizing how the skill 
might be useful on an assignment or an exam. But even so, in this example at 
least, an instructor would be teaching the skill of statutory interpretation that 
is then distilled into issue spotting and analysis of an exam problem, and there 
is worthy and relevant legal reasoning practice in that.
C. Step Three: Facilitating Discovery
In Jerome Bruner’s well-known and -studied spiral learning theory,138 
Bruner places importance on the moment students discover the material that 
the instructor intends for students to learn: “Mastery of the fundamental ideas 
of a field involves not only the grasping of general principles but also the 
development of an attitude toward learning and inquiry, toward guessing 
and hunches, toward the possibility of solving problems on one’s own.”139 
Developing or shaping this attitude toward transfer of knowledge to problem 
solving or practice is key:  
To instill such attitudes by teaching requires something more than the mere 
presentation of fundamental ideas. Just what it takes to bring off such teaching 
is something on which a great deal of research is needed, but it would seem 
that an important ingredient is a sense of excitement about discovery—discovery 
of regularities of previously unrecognized relations and similarities between 
ideas, with a resulting sense of self-confidence in one’s abilities.140  
As an example of instilling discovery in this manner, Bruner describes how 
a sixth-grade class, having been through a conventional unit on the social and 
economic geography of the Southeastern states, was introduced to the North 
136. See Bohl, supra note 129, at 782. Students should be able to find relevance in a skill if it can be 
tied to goals that align with academic success.  
137. See, e.g., William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The Surprising and 
Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 Tex. l. rev. 975, 1045 (2003) (concluding that test-
taking speed and ability correlate to success on law school exams and the practice of law). 
138. Jerome s. bruner, The Process of educATion 52 (1960).
139. Id. at 20.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
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Central region by being asked to locate the major cities of the area on a map 
containing physical features and natural resources, but no place names. The 
resulting class discussion very rapidly produced a variety of plausible theories 
concerning the requirements of a city[.]141  
The consequence was not merely the learning of geography per se, but the 
discovery and learning of the significance of urban planning.142 This moment 
of discovery engages students to prod their sense of curiosity for learning 
something new.
Writing about an exercise for teaching transactional contract drafting in 
law school, William Foster and Emily Grant similarly note the importance in 
adult learning theory of setting up a context that invites a sense of discovery:  
Taking into account the students’ world of memory, experience, and response 
often lightens the mental load involved in mastering a new analytical 
framework or developing a new skill. Professors can better engage adult 
learners by drawing explicit links between the subject matter at hand and 
past experiences of the students. By seeing a connection between something 
familiar and the new material, the students will generally be able to understand 
the new material more quickly and effectively.143
Learning doctrine could be a fairly new and foreign endeavor and so Foster and 
Grant advocate that “[u]sing familiar nonlegal contexts to teach a particular 
legal skill or thought process is consistent with the research about how adult 
students learn[.]”144 The similarity between Bruner’s observations and the 
perspectives of Foster and Grant on teaching through a context that invites 
active engagement signals the importance of building those moments in the 
law classroom. In the quest to elevate skills alongside doctrine, discovery 
serves to bring excitement to skills learning and to obscure that form-over-
function hierarchy. Perhaps this observation was what my colleague at Igniting 
Law Teaching meant by “sneaking in the veggies.”
Once mimesis and relevance have been located in a doctrinal lesson that 
also teaches skills, the moment is ripe for building a particular narrative of 
discovery in the lesson. Sometimes the cases that we cover in law courses 
make it extraordinarily easy to drum up a dramatic and inquisitive moment 
of discovery—cannibalism in Regina v. Dudley and Stephens145 in Criminal Law, 
or selling a farm while seemingly intoxicated in Lucy v. Zehmer146 in Contracts. 
141. Id. at 21. 
142. See id. at 22.
143. William E. Foster & Emily Grant, Memorializing the Meal: An Analogical Exercise for Transactional 
Drafting, 36 u. hAw. l. rev. 403, 409 (2014).
144. Id. at 410.
145. (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.).
146. 84 s.e.2d 516 (Va. 1954).  
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Without relying on sensational cases, an effective demonstration of this idea 
of discovery comes when I teach food defects in Products Liability. After 
assigning cases and giving students the two pertinent tests in food defect law—
the foreign-natural test147 and the consumer expectation test148—I bring in a 
supermarket birthday cake to class (and on occasion with the premise that it’s 
my birthday). The fact that I bring food into the classroom is inherently jarring. 
But once I decide to cut into the cake, the discovery of that access point, the 
mimesis between legal reasoning and law, emerges when I fish out the first 
item that I have surreptitiously stuffed into the cake—usually an eggshell. At 
that moment the students are yanked out of a festive expectation of birthday 
cake into an exercise of reasoning, relying on the tests they have read about 
and their skills of factual inquiry to determine whether the eggshell, and later 
the toothpicks (one wooden and one plastic), the shard of broken glass, and a 
piece of cardboard each individually would make the cake a defective product. 
Knowing how to reason serves as the immediate relevance.
A less gimmicky or stagey example of discovery could be the use of 
episodic television cop dramas, such as Law and Order, in a course on Criminal 
Procedure, where often possible constitutional violations of search and seizure, 
interrogation, police lineups and the like figure into the plot of the shows.149 
The students are allowed through television dramatizations to discover how to 
use rule synthesis between seminal cases and the Fourth Amendment to then 
apply to a warrantless search to see if their conclusions match what actually 
happens on the shows.150 The interesting take on using episodic crime shows 
for law classes is that students might have seen the shows prior to law school, 
but now after being immersed in doctrine and law as law students, they 
presumably “know better,” and so watching examples of criminal procedure 
gone wrong embodies new meaning.  
Referring back to the 2-207 example, I have often taught “battle of the 
forms” as just that—by playing out the narrative of a fact pattern involving 
two large corporations unable to make a lucrative contract because their 
preprinted documents have boilerplate terms that the classic mirror-image rule 
would not tolerate as mutual assent. The moment of discovery comes when I 
reveal the realist response with 2-207,151 but then also I note that in order to use 
147. michAel i. krAuss, PrinciPles of ProducTs liAbiliTy 102 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2014). 
148. Id. at 115. 
149. See Victoria L. Salzmann, Here’s Hulu: How Popular Culture Helps Teach the New Generation of Lawyers, 
42 mcgeorge l. rev. 297, 309 (2010) (discussing the usefulness of television and films to 
demonstrate legal issues in courses such as Criminal Law and Procedure).
150. Older episodes of Law & Order (NBC) and NYPD Blue (20th Century Fox) might work 
better for suspense, since the average law student today would likely have been in infancy 
during the initial runs of those shows.
151. See Corneill A. Stephens, Escape from the Battle of the Forms: Keep It Simple, Stupid, 11 lewis & 
clArk l. rev. 233, 240 (2007) (explaining Karl Llwellyn’s drafting and influence on the 
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2-207 effectively to save this deal, we will need to learn its provisions by also 
learning how to read statutory materials carefully the way that a scrupulous 
lawyer would—in essence, discover the law through an engagement with skill.
To demonstrate their ideas about building a contextual moment for teaching 
transactional contract drafting, Foster and Grant have created an exercise by 
analogizing the process of contract drafting and planning to planning a group 
dinner party.152 In doing so, their goal is to “help[] students get comfortable 
using their ‘legal imagination’ and adding contingency planning value to 
documents they draft for clients.”153 As they articulate more specifically, “[t]he 
basic premise of the exercise is to walk the students through planning a social 
event in this case, a dinner party. In the course of extracting the information 
necessary to prudently and thoroughly coordinate the gathering, students 
will naturally address a wide variety of contingencies that could threaten to 
ruin the experience.”154 Planning a dinner party in this way and delineating 
what happens in the case of a ruined experience is not unlike contemplating 
contingencies in a commercial transaction: “For example, in the exchange 
section of a stock purchase transaction, the seller may agree to transfer duly 
executed stock certificates in transferable form. An analogous obligation of a 
dinner party guest may be to deliver thirty-two ounces of coleslaw.”155 Not only 
is this exercise creative, but it is designed in part to extend familiarity to tame 
what could be a daunting skill to learn; it also alerts the student, by analogy, 
to develop awareness for contingency planning. 
Although step three is concerned with student discovery, this step is in some 
ways also about the creativity of the instructor and ability to tie the connection 
between law and legal reasoning skills to a memorable moment of student 
discovery. But no matter what drama it brings into the classroom, step three 
is always trying to tie the mimesis and relevance to something familiar or 
something that grabs at the emotional expectation of the students to get them 
to see how lively the practice of law is through knowledge and skill.
D. Synthesized Example of Mimesis, Relevance, and Discovery Using Strawberries
One of the observations that most law students encounter in their first year 
is how much factual inquiry plays into the task of lawyering156—how much a 
U.C.C. and that Section 2-207 “was promulgated to correct and remedy the injustices and 
inequities caused by the mirror image rule and last shot rule in modern day commercial 
transactions, and to modernize contract formation in light of present commercial realities.”). 
152. Foster & Grant, supra note 143, at 417-22.
153. Id. at 416.
154. Id. at 417.
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. See Deborah Zalesne & David Nadvorney, Integrating Academic Skills into First Year Curricula: Using 
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon to Teach the Role of Facts in Legal Reasoning, 28 PAce l. rev. 
271, 271-83 (2007) (explaining, in part, the importance of fact sensitivity in legal reasoning 
and the teaching of it in law school).
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lawyer may be asked to play with facts,157 how many different ways playing 
with facts can have variations,158 from simple issue-spotting analyses to large 
persuasive and analogical challenges.159 As much about legal knowledge legal 
education is also very much about the process of lawyering, and being able to 
play with facts, whether simulated or real-life, bears a significant correlation 
to lawyerly competency.160 Thus, I want to develop ways to make expectation 
of factual inquiry nearly obligatory. And with that notion articulated, I often 
begin the year of my Contracts course with a lesson on factual inquiry alongside 
one of the first doctrines I teach my Contracts students: contractual offers.  
For the lesson on offers, I used a picture taken at a farmers market in 
Los Angeles one morning during December 2012. Of course, the picture of 
a strawberry farmer’s fruit display taken from my cellphone seemed rather 
nondescript: The photograph depicted a particular farmstand table showing 
off more than a dozen cartons of red strawberries that framed a white 
cardboard sign reading, “Strawberries 3 Packs for $7,” in misspelled shorthand 
(“Straberri 3 Pak $7”). I had passed by it and would have easily missed it had 
I not been thinking about the Contracts course that I would be teaching the 
following semester. Of course, the picture was externally about strawberries, 
but beneath the surface it could have been about a variety of other things, 
including an introduction to contract formation.  
One of my perceptions of how we commonly misunderstand contract law 
is how pervasively non-lawyers believe that a contract is literally a formal 
document with a myriad of terms and conditions in technical lawyer-speak 
that must be signed by all parties in order for the deal to have effect, instead 
of merely an agreement, written or not, between parties that the law will 
enforce.161 Many new students to Contracts approach the subject with that 
image in mind and also toss in the misperception that to do well in the course, 
157. See id. at 274 (“But students are intent on finding rules, doctrine and ‘the law’ in cases, and 
very often overlook the wealth of information about how the law works contained in the 
cases. In fact, their course syllabi tell them to look for the law and not much else.” (citations 
omitted)).
158. See Zalesne & Nadvorney, supra note 57, at 276 (“We have identified several aspects of issue 
spotting that teachers can help students with, including the baseline ability to recognize 
instances of facts triggering issues, dealing with complicated sub-rules, spotting hidden 
issues, and seeing connections among doctrines within your course and across law school 
courses.”).
159. See Zalesne & Nadvorney, supra note 57, at 276.
160. See Jethro K. Lieberman, The Art of the Fact, 5 J. legAl wriTing insT. 25, 25-26 (1999) (arguing 
that law schools should teach more fact analysis skills because “lawyers spend most of their 
time … ferreting out the facts.”).
161. An even more effective misperception is one in which the same signed contract with all its 
bells and whistles is affixed onto blue-backing paper, rolled up into a scroll, and sealed with 
red hot wax. Of course, the signing must have been done with sharp quills and gooseberry 
ink. For some listed, common non-lawyerly misconceptions about contract law, see generally 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract, 47 wAke foresT l. rev. 843 
(2012).
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one must also have knowledge about math and economics equivalent to a 
graduate degree in finance.162 In some respects, both of those misconceptions 
draw an unnecessary distance between the law and my students. A law student 
with a finance or business background might be presumably thrilled with the 
course at the start and lulled into a sense of perhaps (false) familiarity with 
Contracts, while the law student with no such experience might shy away 
from the thought of contracts. Both notions need to be dispelled and everyone 
needs to be brought onto somewhat equal footing. 
Once within the study of the law of contracts, another problem of insight 
often arises—that some doctrines in contract law were often precise up to a 
certain point, but much of the hands-on lawyerly application of the same 
doctrines to some facts required some sensitivity and intuition even when 
the knowledge of that doctrine had been appropriately mastered.163 This 
observation is compounded by the fact that there is no unifying theory of 
contracts.164 With the farmer’s sign atop the strawberries, we would know if it 
connoted the beginnings of mutual assent in contract formation only once we 
knew the rules for offers and preliminary negotiations. But even if we knew 
those rules in theory, the verbiage and terms of art contained within them—
e.g., “manifestations of willingness to enter into a bargain,” “power of assent,” 
etc.—bring a level of abstraction to an everyday transaction that distracts 
students from taking note of the significance of exchanges that happen very 
quickly between two enterprising parties.  
How would we intuit a statement that we deem definite and certain to be a 
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain? In some situations, a lawyer 
might be able to make an educated assessment and get away with an I-know-it-
when-I-see-it remark.165 However, this nonchalance is reckless and cavalier and 
does not help my students do well on my exams, nor would it likely help them 
in their careers when they are drafting motions attacking formation issues in a 
mortgage suit gone awry or anything else in that vein. So after knowledge of 
the rules, comes the skill of marshaling facts alongside intuition under what 
162. See generally id. 
163. See, e.g., Integrating Academic Skills, supra note 156, at 286 (discussing doctrines of good faith 
and best efforts in contract law as examples of fact-sensitive doctrines suitable for teaching 
factual analysis skills).
164. See Craig Leonard Jackson, Traditional Contract Theory: Old and New Attacks and Old and New Defenses, 
33 new eng. l. rev. 365, 367 (1998) (“Like most subjects of the law, there are grey areas. 
Contracts, no doubt, ranks among the top. The temptation to explain these grey areas by 
unifying theory ultimately fails, and scholars in the contracts field have often reacted by 
trashing the whole exercise.”).
165. For a famous example of this iteration, see Justice Potter Stewart’s concurrence from Jacobellis 
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring):  “I have reached the conclusion . . . that 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally 
limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of 
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I 
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture 
involved in this case is not that.”  (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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the law would govern as a contractual offer. Here is the moment of mimesis, 
when the nature of the law surrounding formation of a contract offers me the 
opportunity to discuss a certain skill in legal reasoning. Here is where the sign 
over the farmer’s strawberries with its price, quantity, and description ends up 
as a lesson that bears so much fruit for both explaining the muscle and spirit 
of the law. This lesson on offers would also be a lesson on marshaling facts.
And that skill has practice implications, which makes the elevating of skills 
with doctrine here a relevant endeavor, since the ability to marshal facts comes 
up not just in my course but throughout the extent of law practice.166 Here in 
Contracts it would be the ability to detect formal rules of contracting in an 
everyday deal over supermarket goods. In Torts, it might be the ability to see 
someone’s negligence maintaining a factory drainage gutter and be able to 
articulate effectively about it as res ipsa loquitur167; or in Business Associations, 
in determining why an intricate act of burying certain funds among different 
corporate entities could be a reason for piercing the corporate veil.168  
In addition, this lesson’s choice of subject matter also had relevance 
implications. With the strawberries, their ordinariness signals to students that 
contracts do happen outside the lawyer’s office and the corporate boardroom. 
Contracts happen regardless of the availability of blue-backing paper and 
wax seals.169 Deals can be verbal;170 exchanges can happen without a single 
word being spoken.171 And they can involve everything from expensive plots 
of oceanfront property right down to the sacks of fresh produce that one 
brings home from the farmers market. The cases we read together in the 
class—of agreements involving requirement jet fuel contracts,172 expensive 
computer equipment for a large company,173 a mass commercial sale of grocery 
166. For an example of the importance of this skill, see Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in 
“Legal Analysis”: A Systemic Approach, 40 u. miAmi l. rev. 409, 431-38 (1985); see also Zalesne & 
Nadvorney, supra note 57, at 276.
167. See Shelter v. Chiquita Processed Foods, L.L.C., 658 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
168. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991), as reprinted in williAm A. 
klein eT Al., business AssociATions: Agency, PArTnershiPs, And corPorATions 212-18 
(6th ed. 2006).
169. For example, there is an array of implied warranties available under the Uniform Commercial 
Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability).
170. See John edwArd murrAy, Jr., murrAy on conTrAcTs Ch. 4 § 69 (5th ed. 2011) (“A promise 
is legally binding though expressed orally or by conduct if the other essentials for contract 
formation exist. Any requirement that a contract be evidenced by a writing is a statutory 
requirement.”).
171. Id.
172. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975), as reprinted in rAndy 
e. bArneTT, conTrAcTs: cAses And docTrine 404-05 (5th ed. 2012).
173. See Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 752 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1990), as reprinted in 
bArneTT, supra note 172, at 814-16.
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chickens174—are inadvertently deceiving. My goal is to use strawberries here to 
shore up the intangible distance of contract law for students, and show how 
hyperbolic that distance really has been.  
The instrumental aspects of the photo allow for closer reading of the objects 
in the image and a different opportunity for students to play with facts than 
had they been described the contents of the photo in a written fact pattern. 
The picture is visible and tangible, as live facts are also seen and not read.175 
The sight of the strawberries in their cartons is supposed to remind them of 
familiar idyllic moments at rural farmstands and open markets, and the sign 
with its scribbled misspellings directs us to negotiations and beckons us to 
discuss within the rules and case law who might be the intended recipient 
of this farmer’s sign (someone particular, or a general public?), how definite 
the sign might be in connoting an offer or, conversely, an invitation to offer, 
whether the misspellings make a difference, whether the quantity and price 
help show a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain or give the 
recipient a power to accept, and what would happen if someone reads the sign 
and tenders exactly seven dollars or responded with a question (How much for 
two packs instead?)—all to decide the legal significance of this image and whether 
we have the beginnings of an agreement formed. To find whether an offer 
exists here or not, students must use the facts they are seeing to tease out the 
law. This endeavor is a sheer example of learning law through skill, learning 
function—it is hoped—at the same level as form.
The discussion over this picture also tells us how our conventions of 
consumer behavior in mass retail and commercial settings help shape how we 
read (or misread) moments of buying and selling things176—moments in which 
contract law figures very firmly as well. Are all the prices and goods one sees 
on supermarket shelves offers or invitation to offer? How about items at an 
electronic retail store instead? Can one ever bargain for a lower price on an 
item at BestBuy?177 The answers to all of these questions are processed through 
a careful, methodical entanglement between law and skills, form and function—as 
they should be—that elevates skills alongside doctrinal knowledge.  
174. See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), as reprinted 
in bArneTT, supra note 172, at 389-94.
175. See Richard K. Sherwin et al., Law in the Digital Age: How Visual Communication Technologies are 
Transforming the Practice, Theory, and Teaching of Law, 12 b.u. J. sci. & Tech. l. 227, 261 (2006) 
(discussing the importance of visual literacy in legal education and that what this means 
is “being able to identify the meanings that pictures leave unsaid and to translate those 
perceptions into words.”).
176. See Jackson, supra note 164, at 367 (“What makes contracts such a hard course has less to 
do with the basic logic than the fact that contract law is essentially about human behavior 
and psychology. It is about trying to decipher what a person did. In trying to discover the 
identity of an individual’s actions, we have to ponder the reasons behind the actions, which 
means that we have to ponder what was in a person’s mind at a given moment.”).
177. Incidentally, haggling at BestBuy is possible. See Hilary Stout, More Retailers See Haggling as a 
Price of Doing Business, n.y. Times, Dec. 16, 2013, at A1.
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As long as I have adhered to the three-step method, much teaching and 
learning utility is rendered out of one image that accesses the intersection of 
those two components essential to practice and furthering the work of the 
law in life. Despite the historical hierarchy of skills and knowledge, the use 
of the three steps here (mimesis, relevance, and discovery) contributes to a 
moment in which a useful and relevant skill of legal reasoning is suddenly 
given an unspoken but important focus to resolve where the law leaves room 
for interpretation. As memorable and resonant as my lesson with strawberries 
has become for both doctrinal and skills competency, the single image here 
achieves the teaching of skills alongside doctrine with very minimal effort, 
and all of it is attributable pedagogically to finding the mimesis of law and 
skill, the relevance of the lesson, and the moment of discovery that can most 
whet student appetites to learning skill and law together without too much 
consideration of what is actually happening pedagogically.  
IV. Conclusion
In some ways, that picture of strawberries that I have used to demonstrate 
to my students how to use facts and law to reach a legal conclusion represents 
not just the method that I developed. The picture also represents my constant 
quest here at the University of Massachusetts for finding normativity in law 
teaching. One image, as an objective correlative, singly captures it all.
Until that hierarchy of doctrinal knowledge and skill and other harmful 
and irrelevant hierarchies are truly abolished in the law school setting, a little 
subversion of Langdell could prove lasting—at least for our students and for 
the quality of our teaching. If inequality and hierarchy are what this article has 
been fixated upon at its broadest angles, then this method for incorporating 
skills with doctrine resembles careful but subversive assimilationist tendencies 
rather than something more innocuous, as sneaking in unwanted good-for-
you ingredients onto a child’s plate. Instead, I hope my method has at least 
provoked readers as food for thought. 
